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1. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, MCI International, Inc. ("MCI") laid off ninety-four employ-
ees, seventy-seven percent of whom were over the age of forty.' The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") sued MCI on behalf of
thirty-nine of the laid-off employees, arguing that the layoff violated the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").2 The court refused to con-
* Special thanks to Richard A. Bales, Associate Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase
College of Law, Northern Kentucky University, and Gail M. Langendorf.
1. EEOC v. MCI Int'l, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 1438, 1479-80 (D.N.J. 1993).
2. Id. at 1444.
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sider the case as a class action, and instead treated it as thirty-nine separate
disparate treatment cases.
3
One of the laid-off employees was Donald Lee.4 MCI argued that it had
fired Lee because of poor performance, but the EEOC refuted this argument
by presenting a positive letter of recommendation from Lee's second-level
supervisor, which recommended Lee's re-hiring and stated that Lee's layoff
was not a reflection of his performance.' The district court, however, dis-
missed the claim, finding that Lee could not show a prima facie case of age
discrimination because he could not point to a similarly situated individual
who was treated differently.
6
If this case had been brought as a single pattern-and-practice class ac-
tion instead of as a group of individual disparate treatment claims, the out-
come likely would have been different. The statistical evidence that a large
proportion of the laid-off employees were over the age of forty (and there-
fore protected by the ADEA) would have shifted the burden of persuasion to
MCI to prove that it had not discriminated against Lee.7 However, because
the court followed the approach that most circuits have taken, that the pat-
tern-and-practice approach to proving discrimination is not available to
plaintiffs bringing individual disparate treatment cases, this route was not
available to Lee, and his case was dismissed
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,9 the United
States Supreme Court held that evidence of pattern-and-practice can be used
in class actions to shift the burden of proof to the employer.' ° However, the
Court did not address whether pattern-and-practice can be used to shift the
burden of proof in individual, non-class action lawsuits." The circuit courts
are divided on this issue.
Five federal circuits have held that an individual, non-class plaintiff
may not shift the burden of proof by demonstrating solely a pattern-and-
practice of discrimination.' 2  These courts have found that the burden-
3. Id. at 1446.
4. Id. at 1455.
5. Id.
6. MCI Int'l, Inc., 829 F. Supp. at 1455.
7. Id. at 1479.
8. Id. at 1455.
9. 431 U.S. 324(1977).
10. Id. at 360.
11. See id.
12. Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 355-56 (5th Cir. 2001);
Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1106 (10th Cir. 2001); Lowery v. Circuit
City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 760-61 (4th Cir. 1998); Gilty v. Viii. of Oak Park, 919 F.2d
[Vol. 28:3:795
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shifting method adopted by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green3 is more suited for individual, non-class claims of discrimination,
and that the pattern-and-practice approach, therefore, is not applicable to
these types of cases.' 4 However, two federal circuits have found that the
language in Teamsters and other Supreme Court cases indicate a willingness
to allow the use of pattern-and-practice evidence to shift the burden of proof
in individual, non-class actions.' 5 These courts have reasoned that evidence
of a pattern-and-practice can change the position of the employer to that of a
proved wrongdoer as effectively as the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
method. 6
This article agrees with the minority of circuits that have held that indi-
viduals can bring pattern-and-practice cases. The traditional disparate treat-
ment model of proof, i.e., the McDonnell Douglas approach, works well for a
plaintiff who has strong circumstantial evidence that the employer has dis-
criminated against the particular plaintiff' 7 However, problems arise when
the plaintiff has overwhelming evidence that the employer engaged in a
broad pattern of discrimination, but little evidence of individual discrimina-
tion. Where the plaintiff already has proven a broad pattern of intentional
discrimination, the burden of persuasion should be on the employer to show
that that pattern did not adversely affect the plaintiff.
Part II of this article analyzes the current types of employment dis-
crimination under Title VII. It begins by explaining disparate impact and
disparate treatment. It then analyzes the methods to prove disparate treat-
ment, including the pattern-and-practice method, which is the subject of this
article.
Part III explains the two different views on whether evidence of pattern-
and-practice discrimination shifts the burden of proof to the employer. Cur-
rently, the majority of courts have held that pattern-and-practice cannot shift
the burden of proof to the employer. On the other hand, a minority of courts
have held that the Teamsters approach should be extended to include indi-
vidual, non-class plaintiffs.
1247, 1252 (7th Cir. 1990); Craik v. Minn. State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 469-70 (8th Cir.
1984).
13. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
14. See Celestine, 266 F.3d at 355-56; Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1095; Lowery, 158 F.3d at
760-61; Gilty, 919 F.2d at 1252; Craik, 731 F.2d at 469-70.
15. Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1559 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Davis v. Cali-
fano, 613 F.2d 957, 961-62 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
16. Cox, 784 F.2d at 1559; Davis, 613 F.2d at 961-62.
17. Davis, 613 F.2d at 961-62.
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Part IV provides a detailed analysis of the competing views. This sec-
tion explains how the use of pattern-and-practice by individuals to shift the
burden is consistent with past Supreme Court cases, why pattern-and-
practice proves discrimination in individual, non-class actions, and how the
Teamsters method promotes the anti-discrimination policy of Title VII.
Part V recommends that courts adopt the Teamsters approach in indi-
vidual, non-class actions because this approach will afford the plaintiff an-
other option when the McDonnell Douglas method will likely prevent the
plaintiff from succeeding in an otherwise-valid discrimination claim.
II. TYPES OF DISCRIMINATION
There are two types of discrimination in the workplace: disparate im-
pact and disparate treatment. This article focuses on pattern-and-practice
evidence in disparate treatment cases. However, in order to fully understand
disparate treatment cases, it is important to know how they are different from
disparate impact cases. To provide this information, this article begins by
analyzing disparate impact actions, and then discusses disparate treatment
actions.
A. Disparate Impact
Disparate impact claims focus on whether employment policies or prac-
tices that are facially neutral and not intended to discriminate nevertheless
have a disparate effect on the protected group. 8 Disparate impact "seeks the
removal of employment obstacles, not required by business necessity, which
... freeze out protected groups from job opportunities and advancement."' 9
With this type of discrimination, the Supreme Court has ruled that a plaintiff
is relieved of proving that the employer had a discriminatory motive.2 ° Prior
to Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,2' proof of discriminatory motive was critical to
the plaintiff's case, as the plaintiff was required to prove that his or her em-
ployer treated the plaintiff less favorably because of his or her race.22
Disparate impact claims involve three stages of proof.23 First, the plain-
tiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer
18. EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1274 (11 th Cir. 2000).
19. Id.
20. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977).
21. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
22. Pamela S. Krop, Note, Age Discrimination and the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34
STAN. L. REV. 837, 838-39 (1982).
23. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982).
[Vol. 28:3:795
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"uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 24 Once the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact, the burden shifts to the
defendant, who may either discredit the plaintiffs statistics or proffer statis-
tics of his own which show that no disparity exists. 25 The employer may also
produce evidence that its disparate employment practices are based on le-
gitimate business reasons, such as job-relatedness or business necessity. 26 If
the defendant fails to show either, the plaintiff prevails, but if the defendant
succeeds in showing a business justification, the burden of production shifts
back to the plaintiff.27 When this occurs, the plaintiff has the duty to show
the existence of an alternative nondiscriminatory practice or policy that
would also satisfy the asserted business necessity.28
B. Disparate Treatment
The second type of discrimination, and perhaps the easiest to under-
stand, is disparate treatment. Disparate treatment occurs where an "employer
simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.' '29 However, while the inquiry in dis-
parate impact is not focused on discriminatory motive, proof of discrimina-
tory motive is critical to claims of disparate treatment.30 Fortunately for the
plaintiff, discriminatory intent "can in some situations be inferred from the
mere fact of differences in treatment."'', The ultimate question in every dis-
parate treatment case is whether the plaintiff was intentionally discriminated
against.32 A plaintiff subjected to this type of discrimination has three ways
to prove discrimination: proof of intent through direct evidence, the
McDonnell Douglas approach, or pattern-and-practice.
1. Proof of Intent Through Direct Evidence
The first method a plaintiff may use to prove disparate treatment dis-
crimination is through direct evidence. Under this theory, the plaintiff offers
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000); Tex. Dep't. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248 (1981).
25. Davis v. Califano, 613 F.3d 957, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
26. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
27. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660-61 (1989).
28. Id. at 661.
29. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
30. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
31. Id.
32. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000).
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"[e]vidence, which if believed, proves existence of fact in issue without in-
ference or presumption. 33 The burden of production then shifts to the em-
ployer to show that it would have made the same employment decision ab-
sent its consideration of the illegal criterion.34 Examples include epithets or
slurs uttered by an authorized agent of the employer, a decision-maker's ad-
mission that he or she would or did act against the plaintiff because of the
plaintiffs protected characteristic, or an employer policy framed squarely in
terms of race, sex, religion, or national origin.35 The Civil Rights Act of
1991 clarified the requirements of using direct evidence of discrimination.3 6
According to the 1991 Act, the plaintiff must show that an illegitimate crite-
rion was a "motivating factor" in the employment decision.37 Additionally,
the 1991 Act stated that the employer can escape damages and orders of rein-
statement, hiring, and promotion by demonstrating that qualification was
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise.38 However, an employer making this showing will still be liable
for attorney's fees and injunctive or declaratory relief.39
2. The McDonnell Douglas Method
In 1973, when faced with the fact that employers seldom provide the
plaintiff with direct evidence of discrimination, the Supreme Court devel-
oped a burden-shifting pattern of proof, commonly referred to as the
McDonnell Douglas test. 40 The function of the McDonnell Douglas method
of proof is to allow the plaintiff to raise an inference of discriminatory intent
indirectly.4 ' It serves to eliminate the most common nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for the employer's action,42 e.g., lack of qualifications or the absence of
an available job.
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court created a three-step process
intended to create a level playing field for both the plaintiff and defendant.43
The plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of dis-
33. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 460 (6th ed. 1990).
34. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
35. See Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1134 (10th Cir. 1999); see also
§ 2000e-2(a)(1).
36. § 2000e-2(m).
37. Id.
38. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii).
39. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i)(ii).
40. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
41. Tex. Dep't. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
42. Id.
43. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
[Vol. 28:3:795
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crimination.4 This prima facie case may be proved by showing: 1) that the
plaintiff belongs to a protected class; 2) that the plaintiff "applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;" 3) that
the plaintiff was rejected; and 4) that, after the plaintiffs rejection, the posi-
tion remained open and the "employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of [plaintiffs] qualifications., 45 If proven, these facts give rise to an
inference that the plaintiff was rejected for discriminatory reasons, creating a
mandatory, but legally rebuttable, presumption that the employer unlawfully
discriminated.46
Once the plaintiff has demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion, "[t]he burden then... shift[s] to the employer to articulate some legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. 4 7 The em-
ployer's burden is one of production only, not persuasion as in disparate im-
pact claims. 4' This means the defendant must adduce evidence sufficient to
allow the fact-finder to reasonably conclude that the employment decision
was not motivated by discrimination.49 If the jury believes the plaintiffs
evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, judg-
ment must be in favor of the plaintiff.5" However, if the employer has articu-
lated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff is afforded a fair
opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively
valid reasons for the rejection were pretext,51 e.g., a cover-up for a racially
discriminatory decision. Often, the plaintiff will attempt to present statistical
evidence of discrimination to demonstrate pretext, as discussed in the next
section.
3. Pattern-and-Practice
A third way of proving disparate treatment is by demonstrating a pat-
tern-and-practice of discrimination. "When Title VII was enacted in 1964, it
authorized private actions by individual employees and public actions by the
Attorney General in cases involving a 'pattern[-and-]practice' of discrimina-
tion.,52 "In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to authorize the EEOC to
44. Id. at 802.
45. Id.
46. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
47. Green, 411 U.S. at 802.
48. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 255-56.
52. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 286 (2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
6(a) (1994)).
2004]
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bring its own enforcement actions" on behalf of the Attorney General.5 3 "In
1991, Congress again amended Title VII to allow the recovery of compensa-
tory and punitive damages by a 'complaining party."' 5 4 This "term includes
both private plaintiffs and the EEOC., 55  To bring a pattern-and-practice
claim, most courts hold that the individual or agency bringing the suit must
bring it as a class action. Some courts, however, hold that an individual
plaintiff may bring a pattern-and-practice suit.
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,56 a civil action may be brought if
there is reasonable cause to believe that any person or group is engaged in a
pattern-and-practice of discrimination. 7 When alleging that an employer's
policies exhibited a pattern-and-practice, the plaintiff must show that there
was a system-wide pattern-and-practice to deny the plaintiff "the full enjoy-
ment of Title VII rights."5 8 The plaintiff must "prove more than the mere
occurrence of isolated or 'accidental' or sporadic discriminatory acts. '59
Senator Hubert Humphrey, during congressional debates on Section
707(a) of Title VII, explained the concept of pattern-and-practice:
a pattern or practice would be present only when the denial of rights con-
sists of something more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but is re-
peated, routine, or of a generalized nature. There would be a pattern or
practice if, for example, a number of companies or persons in the same in-
dustry or line of business discriminated, if a chain of motels or restaurants
practiced racial discrimination throughout all or a significant part of its
system, or if a company repeatedly and regularly engaged in acts prohib-
ited by the statute.
The point is that single, insignificant, isolated acts of discrimination by a
single business would not justify a finding of a pattern or practice .... 60
The plaintiff must establish by "preponderance of the evidence that...
discrimination was the.., standard operating procedure., 61
53. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. at 286 (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of the Northwest v. EEOC,
446 U.S. 318, 325 (1980)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (2000). For a discussion of the
EEOC's history, see Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Employment Arbitration and the EEOC,
27 PEPP. L. REv. 1, 3-9 (1999).
54. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. at 287 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (a)(1) (1994)).
55. Id.
56. § 706(a).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (2000).
58. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).
59. Id.
60. 110 CONG. REC. 14, 270 (1964).
[Vol. 28:3:795
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A pattern-and-practice suit is divided into two phases: liability and
remedy.62 During the liability stage, the plaintiff must prove a prima facie
case of a policy, pattern, or practice of intentional discrimination against a
protected group. 63 The prima facie case may be demonstrated either by sta-
tistical evidence aimed at establishing the defendant's past treatment of the
protected group, or testimony from protected class members detailing spe-
cific instances of discrimination.' If the plaintiff satisfies this prima facie
requirement, "[t]he burden [of production] then shifts to the employer to
defeat [it] ... by demonstrating that the . . . proof is either inaccurate or in-
significant., 65 To challenge the plaintiffs proof, employers usually attack
the source, accuracy, or probative force of the plaintiffs statistics.
66
Once the defendant introduces evidence satisfying its burden of produc-
tion, the jury must then consider the evidence introduced by both sides to
determine whether the plaintiffs have established by preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant engaged in a pattern-and-practice of intentional
discrimination. 61 If the jury finds that the plaintiff has proved a pattern-and-
practice of discrimination, the case may move on to the remedial phase, de-
pending on the remedy sought by the plaintiffs.
If injunctive relief is the only relief appropriate based on the evidence
presented by both sides, an injunction should be awarded. This ends the in-
quiry and the case does not move on to the remedial phase.68 On the other
hand, if relief such as back pay, front pay, or compensatory recovery is re-
quested in the pleadings' in addition to injunctive relief, the court must con-
duct the remedial phase of the trial. 69 The plaintiffs enter this second phase
with a presumption "that any particular employment decision, during the
period in which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit
of that policy."7 This means that each plaintiff must now show only that she
suffered an adverse employment decision and, therefore, was a potential vic-
tim of the proved class-wide discrimination.7 The burden of persuasion then
shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the individual was subjected to the
61. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336.
62. Id. at 360-61.
63. Id. at 360.
64. Id. at 339.
65. Id. at 360.
66. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340.
67. See id.
68. ld. at 361.
69. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361 (1997).
70. Jd. at 362.
71. ld. at 361-62.
2004]
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72
adverse employment decision for lawful reasons. If the employer cannot
meet this burden, the plaintiff is entitled to individualized relief.
73
In sum, a plaintiff attempting to prove disparate treatment is afforded
three ways to prove discrimination. First, the plaintiff can present direct
evidence including admissions by the employer or documents depicting dis-
criminatory actions. Second, the plaintiff can use the McDonnell Douglas
method of proof.74 This test requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
plaintiff belongs to a protected class, "was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants," that the plaintiff was rejected, and that
"after [plaintiffs] rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of [plaintiffs] qualifications."75
Third, the plaintiff can present evidence of a system-wide, pattern-and-
practice of discrimination.
III. USING PATTERN-AND-PRACTICE TO SHIFT THE BURDEN IN INDIVIDUAL
DISPARATE TREATMENT CASES
In class actions and actions brought by the EEOC, the burden of persua-
sion can be shifted to the employer by demonstrating a pattern-and-practice
of discrimination by the employer. 76 Additionally, pattern-and-practice can
be used to prove pretext in the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas
method.77 However, the circuits are split on whether pattern-and-practice can
be used by an individual plaintiff to shift the burden to the employer in an
individual claim of disparate treatment. Most circuits do not allow an indi-
vidual plaintiff to shift the burden by demonstrating a pattern-and-practice,
but a minority of circuits have recognized a plaintiffs right to present such
proof.
A. Rationale Used by Courts That Do Not Allow Burden to Be Shifted
The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held that
pattern-and-practice cannot be used to shift the burden of proof in individual
claims.78 These courts focused on the fundamental differences between class
72. Id. at 362.
73. Id. at 361.
74. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
75. Id. at 802.
76. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360.
77. Green, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
78. Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 355-56 (5th Cir. 2001);
Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1106 (10th Cir. 2001); Lowery v. Circuit
City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 760-61 (4th Cir. 1998); Gilty v. Vill. of Oak Park, 919 F.2d
[Vol. 28:3:795
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actions and individual claims, and held that an inference of discrimination
will not arise in an individual case until the plaintiff has proved all the ele-
ments of a prima facie case.7 9 As a result of these differences, these courts
held that the McDonnell Douglas method is better suited to prove individual
disparate treatment claims.8"
In Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,8" the Fourth Circuit held "that in-
dividuals do not have a private, non-class cause of action for pattern or prac-
tice discrimination under § 1981 or Title VII. ' 82 The plaintiffs, eleven Afri-
can-American current and former employees of Circuit City, brought suit
alleging that Circuit City had a "corporate culture of racial animus toward
African-Americans" mainly because of a group of "white senior managers.""
The plaintiffs asserted that the
all-white management intentionally [demonstrated] racial animus . . .
through discriminatory promotion policies and practices that included,
among other things: (1) excessively subjective procedures and criteria
used to deny opportunities for promotion to qualified African-Americans;
(2) making the existence of job promotion vacancies known only through
informal networks of white employees rather than through formal job
posting procedures; (3) requiring African-American employees to satisfy
more onerous requirements for promotion than those required for white
employees; and (4) maintaining more onerous performance standards for
African-American employees than for similarly situated white employ-
84
ees.
The district court entered judgment in favor of the employees on their
claim that the employer engaged in a pattern-and-practice of discrimination.
Both the employer and employees appealed. 6
The Fourth Circuit framed the issue as "whether individuals have a pri-
vate, non-class cause of action for pattem[-and-]practice discrimination and,
thus, may ... [use] . . . the Teamsters method of proof."87 The court con-
cluded that "although such plaintiffs... [can] use evidence of a pattern[-and-
]practice of discrimination to help prove claims of individual discrimination
1247, 1252 (7th Cir. 1990); Craik v. Minn. State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 469-70 (8th Cir.
1984).
79. See, e.g., Lowery, 158 F.3d at 760-61.
80. Id.
81. 1d. at 742.
82. Id. at 759.
83. Id. at 749.
84. Lowery, 158 F.3d at 749.
85. Id. at 755-56.
86. Id. at 756-57.
87. Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 760 (4th Cir. 1998).
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within the McDonnell Douglas framework, individual plaintiffs are not enti-
tled to the benefit of the Teamsters method of proof. '88 In reaching this con-
clusion, the Fourth Circuit noted that "[t]he Supreme Court has never applied
the Teamsters method of proof in a private, non-class suit charging employ-
ment discrimination. 89
The Fourth Circuit articulated two reasons why the pattern-and-practice
framework is inapplicable to individual disparate treatment cases. First, the
court held that the "manifest" and "crucial" differences between an individ-
ual's claim of discrimination and class actions prevent an individual plaintiff
from shifting the burden solely with evidence of a pattern-and-practice. 90
Second, the court stated that because the remedies sought in individual, non-
class actions are different than the remedies sought in class actions, an indi-
vidual plaintiff should not be allowed to shift the burden of proof through
evidence of a pattem-and-practice.9'
1. "Manifest" and "Crucial" Difference
Focusing on this "manifest" and "crucial" difference, the Lowery court
noted that in class actions, "the plaintiffs first litigate the common question
of fact, i.e., whether the employer utilized a pattern[-and-]practice which
discriminated against the class." 92 Class actions are different from individual
actions because in individual actions, common questions of fact are not liti-
gated, but a specific instance of discrimination is the sole question that must
be answered. 93 Thus, the fundamental difference is that in the individual,
non-class actions, the main inquiry is a particular employment decision,
whereas in class actions, the liability phase focuses not on individual deci-
sions, but on the existence of a pattern of discriminatory conduct.94 How-
ever, the Fourth Circuit stated that evidence of a pattern-and-practice can be
a useful tool in demonstrating that the adverse employment action occurred
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination,
or that the employer's articulated reasons for the adverse action was pre-
text.95
88. Id. at 760-61.
89. Id. at 761.
90. Id. at 760-61.
91. ld. at 761.
92. Lowery, 158 F.3d at 761.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
[Vol. 28:3:795
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2. Difference in Remedies Sought
The Lowery court also focused on the difference in remedies sought in
class actions and individual actions.96 In class actions, plaintiffs "primarily
seek to redress widespread discrimination." 97 Accordingly, the Fourth Cir-
cuit concluded that the relief typically sought is injunctive and may include
requiring the defendant to adopt affirmative action plans or altering a senior-
ity system.98 "On the other hand, in a private, non-class .. .[action], the
plaintiff seeks to remedy individual harm" and seeks remedies such as back-
pay, front-pay, reinstatement, hiring, or damages. 99 The difference between
the two remedies is that the remedies sought in individual cases "require [an]
examination of the circumstances surrounding a single employment action
involving the plaintiff," whereas the class action requires an examination of
the entire class. l00
B. Rationale Used by Courts That Allow the Burden to Be Shifted
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that pattern-and-
practice can be used to prove a prima facie case and shift the burden to the
defendant in private, non-class suits, the Eleventh and District of Columbia
Circuits ("D.C. Circuits") have allowed proof of pattern-and-practice to shift
the burden.'0 1 These courts borrow language from the leading Supreme
Court cases allowing pattern-and-practice in class actions and apply this lan-
guage to individual claims.
An example is the D.C. Circuit case of Davis v. Califano.10 2 In Davis,
Dr. Barbara Davis, a white female employee, "alleged unlawful discrimina-
tion.., based on her sex, in hiring, promotions, and other conditions of em-
ployment, in violation of Title VII."' 3 Dr. Davis provided statistical evi-
dence showing that she was not promoted as quickly as other males with the
same qualifications." She presented data showing: 1) a "disparity in grade
and salary structure between male and female employees;" 2) a "disparity in
promotion rates of men and women employees;" and 3) a "disparity in grade
96. Id.
97. Lowery, 158 F.3d at 761.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1559 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Davis v. Cali-
fano, 613 F.2d 957, 961-62 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
102. 613 F.2d at 957.
103. Id. at 958.
104. Id. at 960.
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and salary structure of male and female employees ... with regard to their
education."' 5 The district court dismissed the complaint, and Dr. Davis ap-
pealed. 0
6
The D.C. Circuit Court framed the issue as whether statistics alone
could prove a prima facie case in an individual discrimination. 7 The D.C.
Circuit Court, quoting the United States Supreme Court, stated that "statisti-
cal proof of a 'broad-based policy of employment discrimination 'provides'
reasonable grounds to infer that individual 'employment' decisions were
made in pursuit of the discriminatory policy and.., require 's' the employer
to come forth with evidence dispelling that inference. ' ' '"8 As a result, the
D.C. Circuit Court concluded that equal force and effect must be given to the
use of statistical evidence regardless of whether the case is brought as an
individual, non-class action or as a class action.'0 9
The Davis court then adopted the same rationale adopted by the Su-
preme Court in Teamsters and applied it to individual, non-class actions."0
The D.C. Circuit Court found that the purpose of a prima facie case is to
"create a greater likelihood that any single [employment] decision was a
component of the overall pattern.' It does not, nor is it expected to, "con-
clusively demonstrate that all of the employer's decisions were part of the
proved discriminatory pattern and practice. '  Proof of a pattern-and-
practice of discrimination "creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of indi-
vidual relief [which] is consistent with the manner in which presumptions are
created generally.""' 3  "Moreover, the finding of a pattern[-and-]practice
change[s] the position of the employer to that of a... wrongdoer [and] ...
the employer [is] in the best position to show why any individual employee
was denied an employment opportunity."' '14 The Davis court concluded that
because proof of a pattern-and-practice of discrimination accomplishes the
objective of the prima facie case, the Teamsters rationale should be applied
to individual actions.'
105. Id.
106. Id. at 958.
107. Davis, 613 F.2d at 961.
108. Id. at 963 (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359
(1977)).
109. Davis, 613 F.2d at 963.
110. Id.
111. Id. (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359 n.45).
112. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359 n.45.
113. Id.
114. Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S.
359 n.45).
115. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE METHODS
There are three reasons why individual plaintiffs in Title VII actions for
disparate treatment should be able to shift the burden of production by dem-
onstrating the defendant had a pattern-and-practice of discrimination. First,
allowing individuals to use the Teamsters approach is consistent with exist-
ing case precedent. Second, use of pattern-and-practice by individuals is
effective proof of discrimination in individual, non-class actions. Third, the
Teamsters approach promotes the anti-discrimination policy of Title VII.
A. Consistent With Case Precedent
The first reason why plaintiffs should be afforded the right to shift the
burden of proof by using evidence of a pattern-and-practice of discrimination
is that it is consistent with past case law. In Teamsters, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that past cases have made it "unmistakably clear that 'statisti-
cal [evidence has] served ... an important role' .. . in which the existence of
discrimination is a disputed issue"'"16 and is "competent in proving employ-
ment discrimination [cases].""' 7  Furthermore, "[i]n many cases the only
available avenue of proof is the use of ... statistics to uncover clandestine
and covert discrimination by the employer.""' 8 In a footnote, the Supreme
Court explained that, "absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that
nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or
less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in
the community from which employees are hired."" 9 "Statistics showing [a
distinct] racial ... imbalance ... [provide] a telltale sign of purposeful dis-
crimination.'
' 20
Case law has supported the fact that the significance of the McDonnell
Douglas method does not lie in its "specification of the discrete elements"
required to prove a prima facie case.' 2' McDonnell Douglas indicates "that
any Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering evidence ade-
quate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on a
116. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 (quoting Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educ. Equal. League,
415 U.S. 605, 620 (1974)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 340 n.20 (quoting United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551
(9th Cir. 1971)); see also Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1382
(4th Cir. 1972).
119. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977).
120. Id.
121. ld.at358.
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discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act."' 122 Thus, "[a]s in any lawsuit,
the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or circumstantial evidence,"'123 as
long as the evidence creates an inference of discrimination. As stated in
Teamsters, statistics can "create a greater likelihood that any single decision
was a component of the overall pattern"'' 24 and are a "telltale sign of purpose-
ful discrimination."'125 Furthermore, "proof of a discriminatory pattern and
practice creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of individual relief [which]
is consistent with the manner in which presumptions are [normally] cre-
ated." 26 As a result, the plaintiff should not be denied the ability to demon-
strate a prima facie case solely through evidence of a pattern-and-practice.
B. Pattern-and-Practice Does Work in Individual, Non-Class Actions
The second reason why individual plaintiffs should be afforded an op-
portunity to use the Teamsters approach is because it is suitable to be used in
individual, non-class actions. In Lowery, the Fourth Circuit stated "that there
is a 'manifest' ... difference between an individual's claim of discrimination
and a class action alleging a general pattern[-and-]practice of discrimina-
tion.'"127 The court determined that in a non-class action, the question of
whether the employer discriminated against the plaintiff in one particular
instance is litigated, whereas in a class action, the question of whether a dis-
criminatory policy existed is litigated.' Therefore, proof of a pattern-and-
practice answers the question of discrimination in the workplace, but not for
that individual plaintiff. Although this difference is clear, it does not justify
prohibiting individual plaintiffs from using evidence of a pattern-and-
practice to shift the burden, for three reasons.
First, the two-phase trial created by the Supreme Court in Teamsters de-
feats this theory.'2 9 During the first stage, the plaintiff demonstrates that "the
employer has followed an employment policy of unlawful discrimination."' 30
If the employer cannot rebut this evidence by clear and convincing evidence,
liability is established and the case moves on to the remedial phase. 3 ' Dur-
122. Id.
123. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3 (1983).
124. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359 n.45.
125. Id. at 340 n.20.
126. Id. at 359 n.45.
127. Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 761 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Cooper
v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 876 (1984)).
128. Id.
129. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360-61.
130. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361 (1977).
131. Id.
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ing the remedial phase, the plaintiff proves that he was, in fact, discriminated
against. 112
Second, to shift the burden, the plaintiff must show that discrimination
more likely than not played a role in the employment decision affecting the
plaintiff.'33 Evidence demonstrating a pattern-and-practice of discrimination
throughout the company or corporation adequately meets this burden.'3 4
Evidence of a pattern-and-practice creates the likelihood that any single deci-
sion was in furtherance of the discriminatory policy. 35 Once this is shown,
the employer becomes a wrongdoer and is in the best position to demonstrate
that the employment actions were taken for legitimate reasons.'36
Third, the evidentiary value of demonstrating a pattern-and-practice of
discrimination should not be, and is not, any less valuable because there are
not multiple parties. Regardless of whether or not evidence of a pattern-and-
practice is brought in an individual, non-class action, or in a class action, its
importance in proving discrimination is the same.
C. Promotes Anti-Discrimination Policy of Title VII
The third reason why individual plaintiffs should be afforded the Team-
sters approach is that it promotes the anti-discrimination policy and goals of
Title VII. 137 "The primary purpose of Title VII [is] 'to assure equality of
employment opportunities and to eliminate ... discriminatory practices and
devices ... .""" Under Title VII, practices and procedures "'cannot be
maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices."",139 Unfortunately, by only affording an individual
plaintiff the use of the McDonnell Douglas approach, employers get away
with intentional discrimination. 40
Forcing the plaintiff to prove discrimination through the McDonnell
Douglas method presents the employer with an advantage."' McDonnell
Douglas works well for a plaintiff with strong circumstantial evidence that
the employer has discriminated against the particular plaintiff. 42 However,
132. Id.
133. Id. at 359 n.45.
134. Id.
135. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359 n.45.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 348.
138. Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)).
139. Id. at 358 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)).
140. See Green, 411 U.S. at 802-03.
141. See id.
142. Id.
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problems with McDonnell Douglas arise when the plaintiff has overwhelm-
ing evidence that the employer has a broad pattern of discrimination, but no
evidence that the particular plaintiff was discriminated against.143 In this
situation, the burden should be on the employer to demonstrate that it did not
discriminate against the individual plaintiff. By affording the plaintiff the
option of shifting the burden through evidence of a pattern-and-practice of
discrimination, the purpose of Title VII will be met.
Past cases have demonstrated the difficulties plaintiffs have when they
have strong statistical evidence, but not enough evidence to prove a prima
facie case under McDonnell Douglas.'44 In Victory v. Hewlett-Packard
Co., 45 the plaintiffs' suit for gender discrimination was dismissed for failure
to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination, despite the fact that the
plaintiff submitted evidence of a pattern-and-practice of discrimination. 146 In
that case, plaintiff alleged that the employer "paid her less than comparably
trained and qualified men, failed to promote her to management positions for
which she was qualified, and failed to equalize the terms and conditions of
her employment."'147 Convincing statistical evidence was presented to dem-
onstrate her claim. 48 First, between the years of 1986 and 1989, twelve male
sales representatives were promoted out of a pool of ninety-five male sales
representatives.149 On the other hand, during this same time frame, out of the
twenty-five female sales representatives, not a single female was pro-
moted. 5° The statistical expert explained that there was a "one in twenty
chance that this outcome could have occurred randomly... [and that] 'there
is no explanation for the fact that women received lower promotion rating
than men."""' Furthermore, a review of salaries showed that women re-
ceived around $7500 per year less than comparably trained and qualified
men. 1
52
In dismissing plaintiffs claim, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York found several problems with the prima facie
case presented by the plaintiff.'53 First, the "plaintiff never applied for a spe-
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 34 F. Supp. 2d 809 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
146. Id. at 821.
147. Id. at 813.
148. Id. at 815.
149. Id.
150. Victory, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 815.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 818-19.
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cific position."' 54 Although this was true, "Hewlett-Packard did not have a
uniform practice of posting openings for management positions or a stan-
dardized written application procedure."' 55 However, the plaintiff had in-
formed her district managers on several occasions of her interest in obtaining
a management position. 5 6 Second, the "[p]laintiff failed to articulate a spe-
cific promotion for which she was denied."'' 57
Victory demonstrates the problems a plaintiff has with the McDonnell
Douglas approach.' 58 Although the plaintiff did not have clear-cut evidence
that she was discriminated against, she did present evidence sufficient to
show that there was a great likelihood that she was discriminated against.'59
It is in this type of case where the Teamsters approach would be advanta-
geous to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that evidence
of a pattern-and-practice is important evidence. 60  Evidence of this type
changes the position of the employer to that of a proved wrongdoer and
forces the employer to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the
employment action was made for legitimate reasons. 6' The Teamsters ap-
proach solves the problem of dismissing cases where there is clear evidence
of discrimination, but not enough to prove the prima facie case."' Addition-
ally, affording this method to individuals is consistent with Title VII's pur-
pose of eliminating all discriminatory policies.
V. RECOMMENDATION
By adopting the use of pattern-and-practice in individual, non-class ac-
tions to prove discrimination, plaintiffs will be afforded multiple options in
proving discrimination in violation of Title VII. Although the Supreme
Court has never specifically held that individuals can use evidence of a pat-
tern-and-practice of discrimination to shift the burden, past Supreme Court
decisions make it clear that the McDonnell Douglas method was not meant
to be the sole method of proving discrimination for an individual.'63
154. /d. at 819.
155. Victory, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 819.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Seeid. at816-17.
159. Id. at 815-16.
160. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977).
161. Id. at 359-61.
162. Id.
163. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
2004]
19
Bross: The Use of Pattern-and-Practice by Individuals in Non-class Claim
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
NOVA LAW REVIEW
In Teamsters, the Defendants argued that the McDonnell Douglas pat-
tern of proof was the only means of establishing a prima facie case of indi-
vidual discrimination."6 The Court responded by stating that:
[t]he importance of McDonnell Douglas lies, not in its specification of the
discrete elements of proof there required, but in its recognition of the gen-
eral principle that any Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial burden of
offering evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment de-
cision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act.1
65
Furthermore, the Supreme Court also stated in United States Postal Ser-
vice Board of Governors v. Aikens, ' that a "plaintiff may prove his case by
direct or circumstantial evidence.' 67  These statements by the Supreme
Court indicate that there is more than just one method by which the plaintiff
may shift the burden to the defendant. 168 These statements also demonstrate
that one of the rationales behind not allowing pattern-and-practice to be used
by individual plaintiffs, which the Supreme Court has never officially al-
lowed, is without merit.
169
As noted above, the Teamsters approach can be applied to individu-
als. 70 Courts should permit individual plaintiffs to demonstrate that adverse
employment decisions were part of a discriminatory policy followed by the
employer. Proof of a discriminatory policy may not be enough to prove that
the individual plaintiff was discriminated against, but it does provide strong
evidence and "create[s] a greater likelihood that any single decision" by the
employer was based on that policy.' 7 ' The Supreme Court has stated that
"proof of the pattem[-and-]practice supports an inference that any particular
employment decision, during the period in which the discriminatory policy
was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy."'
' 72
Once a pattern-and-practice is established, the burden shifts to the em-
ployer to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiffs proof is
inaccurate or insignificant."' If the employer cannot meet this burden, the
164. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358.
165. Id.
166. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
167. Id. at 714 n.3.
168. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
169. id.
170. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 328.
171. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977).
172. Id. at 362.
173. EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1287 n.22 (I 1th Cir. 2000) (citing
Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1559 (1 th Cir. 1986)); Teamsters, 431 U.S. at
362.
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jury may conclude that a violation has occurred. 7 4 At this point, the case
moves onto the liability phase.'75 During this phase, the plaintiff must dem-
onstrate that she "was a potential victim of the proved discrimination."' 76
The concerns over the differences of proof between class actions and
individual, non-class action lawsuits are solved at the liability phase. During
this phase, the individual plaintiff demonstrates that he or she was in fact
discriminated against in a specific instance.177 The proof of an overall policy
of discrimination is merely used to get to this point and to demonstrate that
the employer has a history of discrimination.'78
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has stated that the McDonnell Douglas pattern of
proof is not the sole method of proof available to individual plaintiffs. As a
result, plaintiffs should be afforded the option of demonstrating discrimina-
tion through the use of pattern-and-practice as set out by the Court in Team-
sters.'79 This approach offers three important advantages to an individual
plaintiff. First, the plaintiff can avoid the rigid and sometimes unfair
McDonnell Douglas approach. The pattern-and-practice approach allows the
plaintiff-employee, who has evidence that the employer discriminated, but no
evidence that the employer discriminated against that particular plaintiff-
employee, to shift the burden of proof. Unfortunately, under the McDonnell
Douglas approach, the plaintiff's claim would be dismissed. Second, the
two-phase pattern-and-practice trial shifts the burden of persuasion to the
employer, which is entirely appropriate since the plaintiff already has proven
that the employer engaged in systematic intentional discrimination. Third, in
cases where cladstone proof of discrimination is not available, proof of a
pattern-and-practice of discrimination can provide the plaintiff with a pre-
sumption of discrimination. As a result of these important advantages to the
plaintiff, plaintiffs should be afforded the right to use proof of a pattern-and-
practice of discrimination to shift the burden in individual, non-class actions.
174. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 362.
177. Id. at 361.
178. Id.
179. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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